eelam navy

கடற்புலிகள்

The Sea Tigers (Tamil: கடற்புலிகள்) was the naval wing of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and it was founded in 1984. The Sea Tigers had a number of small but effective suicide bomber vessels. During its existence it had gained a reputation as a capable adversary for the Sri Lankan Navy.] Over the years the Sea Tigers had sunk at least 29 Sri Lankan small inshore patrol boats and one freighter.

The Sea Tigers were led by Soosai, with their main base at Mullaitivu, on the north-eastern coast of Sri Lanka and their last base was taken when the Sri Lanka Army captured Chalai in Mullaitivu in February 2009 .


Sea Tigers backgroundAs the Tamil insurgency gained strength, the LTTE required that much of its supplies to be smuggled in by sea. It was soon realized that a naval component was needed to complement the land-based guerrilla forces. The leader of the LTTE, Velupillai Prabhakaran, understood the necessity of a naval force.

The Sea Tigers were officially founded in 1984. In the first years its primary task was smuggling personnel and equipment between the LTTE's bases in Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka, in particular Jaffna. As the Sea Tiger cadres gained experience, it took on offensive operations against the Sri Lankan Navy.

The leader, 'Admiral', of the Sea Tigers was said to be Soosai. The strategic implementation and execution of Sea Tiger military tactics were guided by leading senior cadre tacticians such as Lieutenant Commander Sri Ram.

A LTTE Sea Tiger fast attack fiberglass boat passing a LTTE supply freighter sunk by the Sri Lanka Air Force just north of the village of Mullaitivu, North-eastern Sri Lanka]Units ]BoatsLight fibreglass boats were used for suicide bomber attacks. These boats could be up to 15 meters long, and were usually equipped with four 250 Hpoutboard engines and a mixture of weaponry: light and heavy machine guns, 15–18 mm guns and grenade launchers. The Sea Tiger attack vessels are only at sea during operations and training; when idle they are loaded on large trailers and hidden in the dense jungle southwest of Mullaitivu or even transported to the west coast if needed.



ShipsThe Sea Tigers also manned a number of larger merchant vessels (sailing under various flags) used for smuggling equipment from neighboring countries.As there were no large ports under LTTE control, the supplies were loaded on to smaller vessels that could land directly on the beaches.From March 2003 to October 2007, the Sri Lankan Navy destroyed ten of these vessels in the Indian Ocean, crippling the LTTE's supply line.

LTTE Sea Tiger head, Colonel Soosai on a Sea Tiger vessel off Mullaitivu[edit]FrogmenFrogmen also served with the Sea Tigers and were used in sinking at least one freighter at the Sri Lankan Navy base at Kankesanturai - KKS, at the northern point of the Jaffna peninsula. They were also involved in the sinking of a SLN supply ship in Trincomalee harbor in May 2008.

On 17 June 2006 on the coast near Colombo, two frogmen belonging to the Sea Tigers were captured by Sri Lanka's army while trying to bomb ships in Colombo Port. News images showed that the frogmen were using rebreathers, probably a type with one oxygen cylinder across the belly. On capture, both tried to commit suicide using cyanide.

]PersonnelThe total personnel strength was between 2,000-3,000 women and men. Women operated the boats on an equal footing as their male compatriots. However the number of personnel may vary depending on operational needs. Local arms caches were hidden in the jungle close to villages.


Major Sea Tiger operationsDuring several of the LTTE offensive campaigns the Sea Tigers landed troops to engage and distract Sri Lankan Army units; the latest was when the LTTE attacked the TamilEela Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal faction in the east in 2004. The most significant use of combined operations was at the Second Battle of Elephant Pass in the Spring of 2000, when some 2,500 cadres were landed behind enemy lines. Previously the largest such operation was the capture of Mullaitivu in 1996, the Sri Lanka Army losing over 1,200 soldiers with all their equipment. The LTTE admitted that during that operation the LTTE lost 330 personnel.

Sea Tigers' fast patrol boats and smaller suicide boats had engaged and sunk around 29 Sri Lanka Navy fast patrol boats. They also attacked the main SLN naval base in a suicide bomber vessel mission at Trincomalee and damaged one of the two SLN catamarans used as troop transports.

SLN troop transport catamaran, sister ship of the one damaged by the Sea Tigers.On October 20, 2006, the Sri Lankan Navy reported that it had sunk 9 Sea Tigers boats, and damaged several others in a major skirmish which reportedly left 171 rebels dead.

On November 1, 2008, a sea battle occurred between Sri Lankan navy and Sea Tigers. During the initial attack at about 05:45 seven Black Sea Tigers died, while four LTTE attack craft were destroyed, 14 Tamil Tigers were killed and about as many others were reported injured. The Sea Tigers then intercepted a twenty-vessel strong Sri Lankan Navy flotilla escorting a hovercraft that resulted in a heavy sea fight. According to pro-rebel sources, at about 7:00 After losing a Dvora Fast Attack Craft (FAC) and the hovercraft, the Lankan navy was forced to withdraw, and had to tow a Water Jet naval craft that was severely damaged to the Kangkeasanthu'rai (KKS) naval base. The battle followed reports that the Sri Lanka's air force had claimed to have bombed a base of the Sea Tiger chief, Soosai and captured a Sea Tiger base at Nachchikuda, along the north-western seaboard. The Sri Lanka Army launched heavy artillery barrages across the Northern Front following the sea battle. The attack also followed a dual Air Tiger air attack.
]Analysts' views of Sea TigersLTTE Sea Tigers boat with a female crew.Jane's International Defence Review, in a report on Sri Lanka, published a few years ago, pointed out that the Sea Tigers "have taken on the Sri Lankan navy with unprecedented success." A recent publication of the Woodrow Wilson School of Politics and International Affairs for the Centre for Strategic and International Studies reckons that they have destroyed 30 per cent of Sri Lanka's navy fiberglass small craft fleet

The Sea Tigers not relying on communications with their command on shore during ongoing operations, was one factor in their success. The Sri Lankan Navy on the other hand was required to act in accordance with commanders onshore. Sea Tiger intelligence also played a key role in their operations, allowing for detailed and bold operations to be carried out in almost silent mode (highest EMCON)
The basis of Sea Tiger offensive operations could be described as sea control and keeping the SLN on their toes with their extensive sea denial tactics in the northern waters of Sri Lanka. Some analysts say the Sea Tigers have adopted the military theory of 'Versatile Maritime Force'. Sea Tiger operations could also be seen as a clear example of asymmetric warfare.

Strategic implications IndiaIndia regards the Sea Tigers as a "nuisance" in South Asian waters and the Indian Armed Forces and Tamil Nadu's state government had increased naval surveillance in the region.] Though no clashes were reported between the Sea Tigers and Indian civil or military ships, Indian experts have suggested the government to "neutralize" it as the ongoing battle between the Tigers and Sri Lankan Navy has affected Indian fishing areas and shipping lanes.

The troop transport vessel "MV Pearl Cruise II" about to dock in Kankesanturai - KKS, at the Jaffna peninsula. The vessel carries up to 700 soldiers and sails regularly between KKS and the main SLN base inTrincomalee. The MV Pearl Cruise II was at the center of a sea battle between the SLN and the Sea Tigers in May 2006 SriLankaThe LTTE once controlled parts of the northern coastline of Sri Lanka, the Sri Lankan forces stationed in the Jaffna peninsula were mainly supplied through naval convoys from Trincomalee in the east. The Sea Tigers bases were well located for attacks on these shipments, and forces the SLN to keep a significant force of fast attack patrol-boats on alert. Sea Tigers have also captured and seized the cargo of at least two Sri Lankan freighters.

In many ways the Sea Tigers had adapted and challenged a larger and more modern Navy, due to their tactics being based on the understanding of SLN operations.

* source: Wikipedia.com